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Recent Developments 
Carpenter Realty v. Imbesi: 
Judgment Creditor is Not Entitled to Post-Judgment Interest from Date of 
an Original Judgment that Was Reversed on Appeal 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held a 
judgment creditor is not entitled to 
post -judgment interest from the date 
of an original judgment that was 
reversed on appeal. Carpenter 
Realty Corp. v. Imbesi, 369 Md. 
549, 801 A.2d 1018 (2002). The 
court further held that unless the 
court includes a specific instruction 
to a trial court that post-judgment 
interest must be awarded dating 
back to the entry of the original 
judgment, such award "should rest 
with the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Id. at 561, 801 A.2d at 
1025. 
Thomas Imbesi ("Imbesi") 
entered into a Stock Redemption 
Agreement ("SRA") with Carpenter 
Realty ("Carpenter"), 7Up/ 
Baltimore ("7Up") and several 
additional 7Up entities. Imbesi later 
redeemed his corporate stock for 
$500,000 plus 5Y4% interest and 
forgiveness ofa $137,158.00 debt 
he owed to the corporations. The 
corporations defaulted on the loan 
in July 1991. Imbesi died on March 
10, 1992. 
Imbesi's personal 
representative filed a lawsuit in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
against Carpenter and 7Up for 
payment. Carpenter and 7Up filed 
a counterclaim against the Estate 
asserting that Imbesi had an 
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outstanding note in the amount of 
$80,000.00 plus 6% interest due 
and payable to them. 
A bench trial ended in a 
$57,447.67 judgment for the Estate, 
which did not include pre-judgment 
interest. A setoff of the $80,000 
note was not allowed because the 
corporations had not filed a timely 
claim for payment against the Estate 
pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 
1991 Repl. Vol.) Section 8-103 of 
the Estates and Trusts Article. 
Carpenter and 7Up appealed. The 
court of special appeals reversed 
and remanded for a hearing on 
whether the note could be used as 
a setoff. 
The circuit court held, in a 
case of first impression, that the 
$80,000.00 note could be used as 
a defensive setoff despite the running 
ofthe statute oflimitations under 
Maryland's Non-claim Statute, Md. 
Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 8-103. 
The court ordered entry of judgment 
in favor of Carpenter and 7Up. The 
Estate appealed and the court of 
special appeals affirmed. The court 
of appeals reversed and remanded. 
The Estate petitioned the circuit 
court for entry of judgment for 
$57,447.67, prejudgment interest of 
$3,588.51 and post judgment 
interest of$30,518.09. Carpenter 
and 7Up filed a cross-petition 
conceding $57,971.27 but 
contesting the pre- and post-
judgment interest. The Estate was 
awarded costs, damages, and 
accrued prejudgment interest. The 
Estate appealed. 
The court of special appeals 
held the Estate was entitled to re-
ceive 10% post judgment interest 
commencing on April 4, 1995, the 
date when judgment was entered in 
favor of the Estate after the first 
trial. Carpenter filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari, which the court 
of appeals granted. 
In its analysis, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland first 
considered Maryland's statutes 
governing post judgment interest. 
Carpenter, 369 Md. at 558, 801 
A.2d at 1023. Maryland Rule 2-
604(b) provides that "a money 
judgment shall bear interest at the 
rate prescribed by law from the 
date of entry." Id. at 558, 801 
A.2d at 1024. Maryland Rule 2-
601 (b) provides that "the effective 
date of entry of a judgment is the 
date on which the clerk of the court 
prepares a written record of the 
judgment." Id. at 559, 801 A.2d 
at 1024. 
The court next determined 
what constituted the date of entry 
of a judgment when the initial 
judgment was reversed and 
remanded and subsequent 
judgments were entered on the 
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record. Id. at 559, 801 A.2d at 
1024. Maryland Rule 8-604( e) 
provides "[i]n reversing or 
modifying a judgment in whole or in 
part, the court may enter an 
appropriate judgment directly or 
may order the lower court to do so." 
Id. at 560,801 A.2d at 1025. The 
court stated that "where our 
mandate specifically directs the 
entry of a judgment after remand, 
post judgment interest on the award 
runs from the date of issuance of the 
mandate." Id. at 560-61; 801 A.2d 
at 1025. When the appellate court 
fails to give the trial court specific 
instructions mandating an award of 
postjudgment interest dating back to 
the entry of the original judgment, 
the trial court may use its sound 
discretion to determine whether to 
make such an award. Carpenter, 
369 Md. at 561,801 A.2d at 1025. 
The court next reviewed the 
history of the case from the entry of 
the original judgment through the 
subsequent mandates issued on 
appeal. Id. The April 10, 1995 
circuit court order entering judgment 
in favor of the Estate was a final 
judgment for purposes of appellate 
review. Id. On August 6, 1996 the 
court of special appeals issued a 
mandate that reversed the original 
judgment and remanded the case; 
the mandate did not specifically 
leave the original judgment in place. 
Id. at 562,801 A.2d at 1026. Either 
party could have filed a motion to 
alter, amend, or revise the judgment, 
requesting the court to leave the 
original judgment in place. Id. at 
563,801 A.2d at 1026. 
Motions to alter, amend or 
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revise judgments are governed by 
Maryland Rule 2-534. Id. This rule 
provides that on motion of any party 
filed within ten days after entry of 
judgment, the court may amend the 
judgment, or may enter a new 
judgment. Carpenter, 369 Md. at 
563,801 A.2d at 1026. Maryland 
Rule 2-535 provides that on motion 
of any party filed within 30 days 
after entry of judgment, the court 
may exercise revisory power and 
control over the judgment and, if the 
action was tried before the court, 
may take any action that it could 
have taken under Rule 2-534. Id. 
Maryland Rule 8-431 governs 
general motions to the court of 
appeals or court of special appeals. 
Id. Because neither Imbesi nor 
Carpenter filed such a motion, the 
court stated that the court of special 
appeals' reversal eliminated the 
April 10, 1995 judgment. Id. at 
567,801 A.2d at 1029. 
The court concluded that for 
purposes of calculating post-
judgment interest, Carpenter and 
7Up were not required to pay the 
Estate until the circuit court entered 
its judgment on October 19,2000. 
Id. at 567,801 A.2d at 1029. Post-
judgment interest was not awarded 
because the judgment in favor of the 
Estate was immediately paid from 
the escrow account upon entry of 
the judgment. Id. at 568,801 A.2d 
at 1029. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland sent a clear message that 
a judgment creditor is not entitled 
to post judgment interest from the 
date of an original judgment that was 
reversed on appeal unless the 
court's mandate specifically dictates 
such an award. To preserve post-
judgment interest, attorneys must file 
a motion requesting the court to 
include specific instructions for the 
calculation of such interest from the 
date of the original judgment in its 
mandate. Where monetary awards 
are delayed by appeals, attorneys 
who make this extra effort protect 
their clients' right to interest 
compensation when the judgment 
becomes final. 
